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The ability to understand the impact of adversarial processes on networks is crucial to various
disciplines. The objects of study in this article are fitness driven networks. Fitness dependent
networks are fully described by a probability distribution of fitness and an attachment kernel.
Every node in the network is endowed with a fitness value and the attachment kernel translates
the fitness of two nodes into the probability that these two nodes share an edge. This concept is
also known as mutual attractiveness. In the present article, fitness does not only serve as a measure
of attractiveness, but also as a measure of a node’s robustness against failure. The probability that
a node fails increases with the number of failures in its direct neighborhood and decreases with
higher fitness. Both static and dynamic network models are considered. Analytical results for the
percolation threshold and the occupied fraction are derived. One of the results is that the distinction
between the dynamic and the static model has a profound impact on the way failures spread over the
network. Additionally, we find that the introduction of mutual attractiveness stabilizes the network
compared to a pure random attachment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The investigation of contagious processes is a vital part
of many fields in academia, whether it is the transmission
of sexual diseases, studied in social science [1], the spread
of financial distress in economics [2, 3] or the spread of
viruses in epidemiology [4]. The most simple transmis-
sion models assume perfect mixing of the underlying pop-
ulation. In other words, contacts between banks, sexual
partners or pedestrians are purely random. This sim-
plification is made in order to be able to formulate a
system of coupled nonlinear differential equations that
can be solved with ease [5]. However, this assumption
is an oversimplification of the underlying problem. Con-
tact patterns are largely heterogeneous [6]. This hetero-
geneity has been endogenized by considering underlying
networks that describe different contact motifs [7–10].
Beyond the introduction of a topology of contacts,
further aspects have been introduced, such as timing
and local transmission probabilities [5], in order to ac-
count for real-life phenomena. The spreading behavior in
multi-layered network architectures and networks of net-
works has also been investigated [11–14]. Other features,
such as awareness and vaccinations were considered too
[15, 16]. In other studies, more complex models that at-
tempt to explain default cascades, occurring for instance
in financial markets, have been considered [3]. In [3] a
model was set up that takes into account different kinds
of shocks, as well as correlations, not only degree-degree
but also degree-robustness, and a model specific market
illiquidity parameter.
The present article considers a flat network, in the
sense that it consists of one layer. The underlying topol-
ogy is not chosen to be arbitrary, it is derived from a
hidden variable model [17–21]. In contrast to node de-
gree based models, such as the Baraba´si-Albert model
[22], or models, that combine local attractiveness to-
gether with node degree as an attractor for new edges
[23], fitness/hidden-variable models are purely driven by
static node intrinsic fitness. The two functions that de-
termine the topology of the network and all related quan-
tities are the attachment kernel f(x, y), that describes
the probability that a node with fitness x originates an
edge towards a node with fitness y, and the probabil-
ity density ρ(x), that describes the distribution of fitness
in the system. The literature on pure fitness models is
split into two parts, static and dynamic models, which
are both considered in this paper. Static networks have
been identified as the correct model in various applica-
tions such as the interbank lending market and the world
trade network [24–26]. Their dynamic counterpart, intro-
duced in [20], relies on assumptions that are met in sev-
eral real-world examples. The attractiveness of fitness
driven models in general is the amount of information
that a local agent is assumed to have. While degree de-
pendent growth models assume that new nodes have in-
formation about the connectivity of the entire network,
it is sufficient for fitness dependent models to assume
that nodes have information about the ranking of some
derived, topological independent quantity. Consider for
instance the network of investments. The balance sheet
structure of an enterprise is more likely to be accessible to
an investor than the absolute number of other investors
invested in a particular company.
In this paper, we couple for the first time attractive-
ness and resilience. Fitness determines the propensity to
acquire more edges in the network, but also measures ro-
bustness against failures in the direct neighborhood of a
node. This association of attractiveness and robustness
is not just interesting as an exercise for a theoretician,
it is of great interest to organizations that can influence
the underlying free parameters, such as the distribution
of fitness, as well as the average node-degree in the sys-
tem. Consider for example the interbank lending market.
Assuming that the selection process is fixed, in the sense
that f(x, y) is given and cannot be influenced, the pol-
2icy maker or regulator can create incentives to stimulate
interaction between existing agents in the form of new
edges that increase the average node degree, or they can
reshape the fitness distribution ρ(x) by the introduction
of a tax. It is shown later in the paper that these two
quantities largely influence the percolation threshold as
well as the fraction of the network that is occupied by
the giant vulnerable component.
Attractiveness and robustness cannot always be as-
sumed to correspond one-to-one, such as in the case
of the sexual contact network that has been investi-
gated in [1]. However there are many scenarios in which
this correspondence appears realistic, consider again the
interbank-lending market. Here, attractiveness is derived
directly from the likelihood to file for bankruptcy. An-
other possible model is the network of buyer-supplier re-
lationships in the technological sector. Think of the ar-
rival of a new technology as an epidemic process. In this
case large suppliers are attractive due to their size, but
also control the adoption of new technologies. One exam-
ple is the Flash-technology, that has never been adopted
by Apple on its mobile devices.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
In Section II the two models under investigation are pre-
sented. In Section III the core results on percolation for
the given models are derived. In Section IV the main
results are presented. Section V closes the article with
concluding remarks.
II. MODELS
In this paper we study the exposure of contact net-
works, that are not necessarily heterogeneous, to random
failures. We consider two different classes of network for-
mation models. These are static fitness models [17] and
their dynamic counterpart [20]. The distinctive charac-
teristics of these two networks is the set of nodes. The
dynamic model is characterized by a constant addition
of nodes, while the static model comprises a fixed num-
ber of nodes. The timescale of the network formation
is assumed to be longer than the typical timescale of the
spread of a failure, such that the formation of the network
and its occupation with a large failed component can be
considered separately. Fitness models are characterized
by an attachment kernel f(x, y) and a fitness distribution
ρ(x). The attachment kernel f(x, y) describes the prob-
ability that a node with fitness x originates a new edge
toward a node with fitness y. The fitness of each node is
static over the lifetime of the network and is drawn from
the probability density ρ(x). Fitness is assumed to be
distributed over the unit interval [0, 1]. If fitness is dis-
tributed over another interval in a particular application
it can always be normalized to the interval [0, 1].
The network that we consider is directed and every
agent is in one of two states, bankrupt or solvent / dead
or alive / technology-adapter or -refuser, / infected or
susceptible etc. Although the model can be understood
in terms of many applications, it is in general a binary
rule as it was introduced in [27]. The two states will be re-
ferred to as solvent and bankrupt hereafter. Every agent
i is initially solvent and changes its state to bankrupt if a
critical fraction of the agents in the agent’s neighborhood
have gone bankrupt. This critical fraction is given by its
fitness xi. If at least a fraction xi of a node’s neighbors
has changed its state to bankrupt, node i also changes
its state from solvent to bankrupt. The networks under
investigation here are both directed. In the context of
the interbank lending market, an edge from a bank i to a
bank j represents a money flow from i to j. If too many
banks that have borrowed money from node i fail, bank i
will also fail. The critical fraction is hence coupled to the
out-degree of a node, since exposure flows against edge-
directionality. Consider now a randomly induced initial
bankruptcy somewhere in the network. This bankruptcy
can only propagate to a neighbor that has a fitness value
such that xi ≤ 1/kouti . Nodes that fulfill this condition
are referred to as vulnerable. Once the initially solvent
network is perturbed with the state change of a single
bankruptcy, the spread of bankruptcies over the network
develops asynchronously in accordance the simple thresh-
old rule xi ≤ 1/kouti .
The vulnerability condition x ≤ 1/k implies that a
bank distributes its lent money uniformly over all its
obligors, which might be different in the real world but
we will abstract from this possibility for the sake of sim-
plicity. If the vulnerability condition is fulfilled, a single
failing bank in the neighborhood of a node i can cause i
to fail as well.
A. Static model
The static fitness model describes a network that com-
prises a fixed number of nodes N and edges M . Since fail-
ures/adaptations can only spread against the direction of
edges, the quantity of interest here is the out-degree of
a node. Analytical results on the degree distribution for
this model have been obtained earlier, see for instance
Refs. [17, 19]. In order to consider percolation in this
network, it is necessary to obtain the fitness-conditional
out-degree distribution. This quantity, also referred to as
the propagator has been found to be Poissonian in Ref.
[18]. While the propagator is derived constructively in
Ref. [18], a derivation from first principles is described
below.
Although the network is static i.e. it contains a fixed
number of nodes, the process in which edges are added
can be understood as a dynamic procedure. Edges are
deployed one by one, not all at the same time. An
edge is added to a pair of nodes i → j with probability
f(xi, xj)/
∑
k,l f(xk, xl). The networks under consider-
ation are sparse, in the sense that M  N2, thus the
possibility of adding an edge to a pair of nodes that is al-
ready connected is negligible in the thermodynamic limit.
The probability that a node with fitness x increases its
3out-degree by one during an edge-addition step is defined
as
λ(x,N) =
N∑
l=1
f(x, xl)∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 f(xi, xj)
. (1)
That is the properly normalized probability that an edge
is deployed originating from a node with fitness x. For
large N , fitness can be considered as a continuous vari-
able, which leads to
λ(x,N) =
1
N
∫ 1
0
f(x, y)ρ(y)dy∫∞
0
∫∞
0
f(ξ, η)ρ(ξ)ρ(η)dξdη
. (2)
Since 1/N is a factor of λ(x,N), we can define λ(x) =
Nλ(x,N). Using the postulate that the edge addition
procedure can be understood as a sequential process, the
fitness-conditional degree distribution can be found using
a rate equation approach. The probability that a node
with fitness x has out-degree k in a network with N nodes
and M edges will be denoted with p
(s)
M,N (k|x) and evolves
as
p
(s)
M+1,N (k|x) = p(s)M,N (k|x) (1− λ(x,N))
+ p
(s)
M,N (k − 1|x)λ(x,N).
(3)
The first part of Eq. (3) corresponds to the an edge up-
date that occurs at a node with fitness unequal to x, the
second part corresponds to an edge update that increases
the out-degree of a node with fitness x by one. The so-
lution of Eq. (3) is given by
p
(s)
M,N (k|x) =
e−M/N λ(x)(MN λ(x))
k
Γ(k + 1)
. (4)
The details of the derivation can be found in Appendix A.
This result is sufficient to characterize vulnerable nodes
in the network. The probability that a randomly chosen
node has degree k and is vulnerable, i.e. whose fitness
value is less than the reciprocal of its out degree, is de-
fined as Q(s)(k) = P[kouti = k ∩ xi ≤ 1/k] and can be
expressed in terms of p
(s)
M,N (k|x):
Q(s)(k) =
∫ 1/k
0
p
(s)
M,N (k|x)ρ(x)dx (5)
=
1
Γ(k + 1)
∫ 1/k
0
e−M/N λ(x)
(
M
N
λ(x)
)k
ρ(x)dx.
(6)
This expression is in excellent agreement with results
from numerical simulations of the network assembly pro-
cess. Fig. 1 compares the prediction of Eq. (6) with nu-
merical simulations for various cases of ρ(x),f(x, y) and
M/N . Another observation from Fig. 1 is that the qual-
itative differences between Q(s)(k) for exponential- and
Pareto distributed fitness are minimal. The qualitative
differences between random attachment, i.e. f(x, y) = 1
and mutual attractiveness with f(x, y) = xy become
more evident for large M/N . The average out-degree
changes the behavior of Q(s)(k) significantly. The distri-
bution becomes generally broader for higher M/N . One
more interesting aspect of the network is the effect of di-
versification. Fig. 2(a) shows the conditional probability
that a randomly chosen node is vulnerable, given that it
has degree k. That is
P[x ≤ 1/k | kouti = k] =
Q(k)
P (k)
(7)
with P (k) =
∫ 1
0
pM,N (k|x)ρ(x)dx. Fig. 2(a) shows that
for the case of mutual attractiveness, the transition be-
tween finding a vulnerable node with certainty and not
finding any vulnerable node for a given degree is occur-
ring at higher degrees for larger 〈k〉. This implies that
adding new edges destabilizes the system. This adverse
diversification effect is at first glance counterintuitive. It
implies that the higher the average degree is in the sys-
tem, the larger is the probability that a node with a given
degree is vulnerable. In other words, given a node with
degree k′ > 1, it is more likely that this node is vulner-
able in a system with 〈k〉 = k′, than in a system with
〈k〉 = 1. This is because in a system with average degree
〈k〉 = 1, a node has to have a greater than average fitness
to attract k′ edges, and therefore is more unlikely to fail.
In a system with 〈k〉 = k′ however, a node only needs to
have average fitness to attract k′ many edges. Due to its
lower fitness, it is therefore more prone to failures. The
case of random attachment, i.e. f(x, y) = 1 shows an
entirely different behavior. The quotient Q(s)(k)/P (s)(k)
is almost the same over the whole range of k. This arises
from the form of ρ(x), for f(x, y) = 1, the quotient is
given by
Q(k)
P (k)
=
∫ 1/k
0
ρ(x)dx. (8)
The case of random attachment is different because fit-
ness does not have an influence on the degree of a node.
The probability for a randomly chosen node to be vul-
nerable simply decays therefore with the cumulative dis-
tribution of fitness as shown in Eq. (8). Fig. 2(b) shows
that adding additional edges to the network has a posi-
tive effect overall, as expected. The fraction of vulnerable
nodes decays with increasing 〈k〉.
Other quantities of interest are the conditional and
the unconditional expectation of the out-degree of a ran-
domly chosen node E[k|x] and 〈k〉 respectively. These
are obtained as
E[k|x] =
∑
k≥0
kp
(s)
M,N (k|x) =
M
N
λ(x) and (9)
〈k〉 =
∫ 1
0
E[k|x]ρ(x)dx = M
N
∫ 1
0
λ(x)ρ(x)dx. (10)
Since the average out-degree of a node is determined by
the number of edges M divided by the number of nodes
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FIG. 1. (Color online) The plots show Q(s)(k) for different fitness distributions: (a) shows different configurations with fitness
distributed exponentially on the unit-interval, with average fitness 〈x〉 = 0.05. (b) shows different configurations with Pareto
distributed fitness on the interval [10−3, 1], whereby the zero is excluded to avoid the singularity. Random selection, i.e
f(x, y) = 1 is marked will hollow symbols, mutual attractiveness, i.e. f(x, y) = xy with solid markers. The different plot
markers, distinguish different average degrees: 〈k〉 = 1 squares (yellow), 〈k〉 = 2 circles (blue), 〈k〉 = 5 triangles (brown),
〈k〉 = 10 downward triangles (purple). The lines indicate analytical results from Eq. (6), whereby solid lines represent the case
of f(x, y) = xy and dashed lines f(x, y) = 1. Numerical results are obtained in a network with N = 104 nodes, averaged over
50 network realizations.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Plot (a) shows degree-conditional
probabilities of vulnerability for different average degrees
M/N = 1: dot-dashed (mustard), M/N = 5: fine-dashed
(blue), M/N = 10 coarse-dashed (purple). Examples for
f(x, y) = xy are indicated with different dashing patterns,
random attachment f(x, y) = 1 as dotted lines. The dotted
lines are all overlapping, indicating that for random attach-
ment, the conditional probability to find a vulnerable node
is independent of M/N . This is analytically confirmed in
Eq. (8). Plot (b) illustrates the relationship between the frac-
tion of vulnerable nodes in the network and the average degree
〈k〉. The configuration in this example is power-law fitness,
i.e. ρ(x) = x−a, x ∈ [10−3, 1] a : 〈x〉 = 0.05. The solid line
shows the result for f(x, y) = xy, the dashed line represents
random attachment, i.e. f(x, y) = 1.
that are in the network N , Eq. (10) implies a normaliza-
tion condition for ρ(x) and λ(x), such that
∫ 1
0
λ(x)ρ(x)dx = 1. (11)
B. Dynamic model
The dynamic model, as opposed to the static model, is
characterized by sequential additions of nodes and edges.
Thus, the discrete time, Markov chain approach that is
used in the previous subsection is employed here again.
The dynamic model that is investigated here is similar to
the model in Ref. [20]. While an undirected network is
considered in Ref. [20], the network in the present paper
is directed. The evolution is as follows. At every time-
step, one of two things can occur:
(i) With probability q, a new node is created and en-
dowed with a fitness value x, drawn from a probability
density ρ. A node inside the network is then chosen ran-
domly to form a new edge toward this new node. The
origin of this edge depends mutually on the new node’s
fitness x and the originating node’s fitness y. The prob-
ability for such an edge is f(y, x)/
∑N(t)
l=1 f(xl, x).
(ii) With probability 1 − q, a new edge between two
existing nodes inside the network is created. The proba-
bility for a new edge i→ j is f(xi, xj)/
∑N(t)
k,l f(xk, xl).
New nodes are added to the network with an incoming
edge, this implies that for q = 1, the network is a perfect
tree, with edges pointing from the root node toward the
leafs. Consider again the interbank lending market. The
rule above implies that a bank enters the market with a
loan request. Alternatively, consider the network of cash-
flows in buyer-supplier relationships. In this case, the
growth rule translates into a scenario in which a company
enters the market as a seller.
The fitness-conditional degree distribution for the dy-
namic networks is similarly derived as it is presented in
Ref. [20]. The main difference is the introduction of
5directionality. Also, while Ref. [20] compressed the dis-
tinction between the attachment kernel f(x, y) and the
fitness distribution ρ(x), these two functions remain ex-
plicit in the calculation below, to facilitate later analysis.
The central quantity of this model is the probability
that a node with fitness x originates a new edge at time
t. This quantity is defined as
θq(x, t) = q
∫ 1
0
f(x, y)∑N(t)
i=1 f(xi, y)
ρ(y)dy
+ (1− q)
∑N(t)
l=1 f(x, xl)∑N(t)
i=1
∑N(t)
j=1 f(xi, xj)
.
(12)
The first part of Eq. (12) corresponds to a node addi-
tion step. The term inside the integral is the properly
normalized probability that the node with fitness x ini-
tiates an edge toward the new node, averaged over all
possible fitness of the newly added node. The second
term corresponds to the case of edge addition. The frac-
tion is the properly normalized probability that a node
with fitness x receives a new outward pointing edge. The
sums run over all nodes that are present in the network
at time t. We consider the case of a sparse network, such
that the number of edges is at all times O(N(t)). Thus,
the problem of edge duplications can be neglected in the
leading order approximation. Using that the distribu-
tion of fitness inside the network (xi)
N(t)
i=1 is in the limit
of large t simply described by ρ(x) and that for t → ∞
the expected value of N(t) is given by qt, Eq. (12) can
be written in terms of continuous fitness as
θq(x, t) =
1
t
[∫ 1
0
f(x, y)ρ(y)∫ 1
0
f(ξ, y)ρ(ξ)dξ
dy
+
(1− q)
q
∫ 1
0
f(x, y)ρ(y)dy∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
f(ξ, η)ρ(ξ)ρ(η)dξdη
]
.
(13)
Since 1/t is a factor of θq(x, t) in the t→∞ limit, we can
use θq(x) = tθq(x, t) in the following. The evolution of
the out-degree distribution of a node with fitness x that
joined at τ , p
(d)
t (k|x, τ) obeys
p
(d)
t (k|x, τ) = p(d)t (k|x, τ) (1− θq(x, t))
+ p
(d)
t (k − 1|x, τ) θq(x, t).
(14)
The first term in Eq. (14) corresponds to the situation
in which an edge is added to a node that has a fitness
different from x. The second term corresponds to an
update around a node with fitness x. The solution of
Eq. (14) is given by
p(d)(k|x) =
(
θq(x)
1 + θq(x)
)k
1
1 + θq(x)
. (15)
The details of the derivation can be found in Appendix B.
The probability that a randomly chosen node has degree
k and is vulnerable is calculated in the same way as in
the previous subsections and is given by
Q(d)(k) =
∫ 1/k
0
p(d)(k|x)ρ(x)dx (16)
=
∫ 1/k
0
(
θq(x)
1 + θq(x)
)k
ρ(x)dx
1 + θq(x)
. (17)
The conditional expectation of the out-degree is given by
E[k|x] =
∑
k≥0
kp(d)(k|x) = θq(x) (18)
and the average degree is
〈k〉 =
∫ 1
0
E[k|x]ρ(x)dx = 1
q
. (19)
As in the previous section, this can be verified by consid-
ering that the average out-degree must equal the number
of edges divided by the number of nodes in the network.
This fraction is for t → ∞ given by (qt + (1 − q)t)/qt =
1/q. Fig. 3 shows the comparison of numerical simula-
tions to the analytical prediction of Eq. (17). The agree-
ment between them is excellent. Compared to Fig. 1, the
probability Q(d)(k) is broader than Q(s)(k). Thus vul-
nerable nodes with high degrees are more likely to exist
in the dynamic model than in the static model. Another
interesting graphical indicator is the degree-conditional
probability that a randomly chosen node is vulnerable.
This quantity corrects for implications of the degree dis-
tribution. Fig. 4(a) displays this probability, given by
Q(d)(k)/P (d)(k). Compared to Fig. 2(a), the decay of
Q(d)(k)/P (d)(k) occurs at smaller values of k for all dif-
ferent 〈k〉 configurations. Also, the decay is slower than
in the static case and largely influenced by different val-
ues of 〈k〉. Qualitatively, Figs. 4(a) and 2(a) are similar,
they both display the phenomenon of adverse diversifi-
cation, that is discussed above. However, also in the
dynamic case is the overall fraction of vulnerable nodes
decaying in increasing 〈k〉, see Fig. 4(b).
III. PERCOLATION
After the main topological property of interest, the de-
gree distribution of vulnerable nodes has been derived in
the previous section, this section reviews the methodol-
ogy that is used to calculate the main properties of the
vulnerable component. The approach we take has been
used elsewhere [5, 27–29] and is reviewed here for com-
pleteness.
First, define the generating function of the probability
that a given node has degree k and is vulnerable Q(i)(k),
as
G
(i)
0 (s) =
∑
k≥0
Q(i)(k)sk, i ∈ {s,d}. (20)
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FIG. 3. (Color online) The plots show Q(d)(k) for different fitness distributions: (a) shows different configurations with fitness
distributed exponentially on the unit-interval, with average fitness 〈x〉 = 0.05. (b) shows different configurations with Pareto
distributed fitness on the interval [10−3, 1], whereby the zero is excluded to avoid the singularity. Random selection, i.e
f(x, y) = 1 is marked will hollow symbols, mutual attractiveness, i.e. f(x, y) = xy with solid markers. The different plot
markers, distinguish different average degrees: 〈k〉 = 1 squares (yellow), 〈k〉 = 2 circles (blue), 〈k〉 = 5 triangles (brown),
〈k〉 = 10 downward triangles (purple). The lines indicate analytical results from Eq. (17), whereby solid lines represent the
case of f(x, y) = xy and dashed lines f(x, y) = 1. Numerical results are obtained in a network with N = 106 nodes, averaged
over 20 independent network realizations.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Part (a) shows degree-conditional
probabilities of vulnerability for different average degrees
〈k〉 = 1 dot-dashed line (mustard), 〈k〉 = 5 fine dashed (blue),
〈k〉 = 10 coarse dashed (purple). The dotted line is an over-
lap of all 〈k〉 configurations with random attachment, i.e.
f(x, y) = 1. All other lines correspond to f(x, y) = xy. The
underlying fitness distribution is a power law with 〈x〉 = 0.05.
The overlapping lines indicate that for random attachment,
the conditional probability to find a vulnerable node is inde-
pendent of the average degree 〈k〉. Figure (b) illustrates the
relationship between the fraction of vulnerable nodes in the
network and the average degree. The underlying configura-
tion is again a power-law on [10−3, 1] with 〈x〉 = 0.05. Solid
(dashed) line corresponds to f(x, y) = xy (f(x, y) = 1).
The superscript notation that indicates the specific
model is suppressed in the following. Furthermore, the
excess degree distribution [29] describes the probability
that a randomly chosen neighbor of a randomly picked
node is vulnerable and has k + 1 neighbors in total (k
many neighbors, without the randomly picked node). To
be more precise, for this case of a directed graph, it is
the probability to find a vulnerable node with out-degree
k + 1, following a randomly chosen edge against its di-
rection. This probability is proportional to the number
of edges that are emitted from vulnerable nodes with de-
gree k + 1, correctly normalized with the average degree
in the network:
R(k) =
(k + 1)Q(k + 1)∑
k≥0 kP (k)
. (21)
The normalization is correct, since the node is a random
choice taken from the set of all nodes, and not just from
the set of vulnerable ones. Also, the generating function
for R(k) is defined as
G1(s) =
∑
j≥0
(j + 1)Q(j + 1)
〈k〉 =
G′0(s)
〈k〉 . (22)
Denote the number of nodes that can be reached fol-
lowing only connected nodes along the direction of their
edges with t and the distribution of t with φ(t). The
corresponding generating function is defined as
H1(x) =
∑
t≥1
xtφ(t). (23)
Additionally, H0(x) is the generating function for the
probability that a randomly chosen node belongs to a
component of size t. H0(x) and H1(x) can be calculated
directly, and are given by
H0(x) = 1−G0(1) + xG0(H1(x)) (24)
H1(x) = 1−G1(1) + xG1(H1(x)). (25)
7The details of the derivation can be found in Appendix C.
The form of these two equations is standard. Equivalent
results can also be found in Refs. [27, 30] for example.
The average size of the vulnerable component can be
obtained from H ′0(1) as
〈n〉 = H ′0(1) =
G0(1) + (G
′
0(1))
2
〈k〉 −G′′0(1)
. (26)
The phase transition between a finitely sized vulnerable
component and a vulnerable component that spans over
the entire network can be calculated from Eq. (26). The
infinitely sized cluster emerges when 〈n〉 diverges, thus
when 〈k〉 = G′′0(1). This condition can be written for the
static model as∑
k≥0
k(k − 1)
Γ(k + 1)
∫ 1/k
0
e−M/N λ(x)
(
M
N
λ(x)
)k
ρ(x)dx =
M
N
.
(27)
For the dynamic model it is given by
∑
k≥0
k(k − 1)
∫ 1/k
0
(
θq(x)
1 + θq(x)
)k
ρ(x)dx
1 + θq(x)
=
1
q
. (28)
Eqs. (27) and (28) define the percolation threshold, in
other words for any two of ρ(x), M/N , λ(x), respectively
ρ(x), q and θq(x) held fixed, these equations define the
point of phase transition between an infinitely cluster and
a finite percolation in terms of the third variable.
Apart from the percolation threshold, other quantities
of interest can also be derived from the theory that is laid
out above [27, 28, 30]. Eq. (C8) describes the generating
function for the sizes of vulnerable clusters in the net-
work. This generating function is expressed in terms of
two other generating functions: G0(1), which is already
calculated above, and H1(x) which is given implicitly in
Eq. (C9). Remember, H0(x) is the generating function
for the distribution of outbreaks outside the percolating
cluster, if it exists. The fraction of nodes in the largest
vulnerable component S can therefore be computed with
H0(1):
S = 1−H0(1). (29)
S can be computed using Eq. (C8) and solving Eq. (C9)
numerically [30]:
S = G0(1)−G0(ξ), (30)
whereby ξ solves
ξ = 1−G1(1) +G1(ξ). (31)
One trivial solution of Eq. (31) is ξ = 1. The function
ϕ(ξ) = G1(ξ)−ξ+1−G(1) can maximally have one more
root. This follows from the following consideration. The
derivative of ϕ(ξ) is G′1(ξ) − 1 and the derivative of the
derivative is G′′1(ξ) which is strictly positive by definition
of G1(ξ). Thus the derivative of ϕ(ξ) must be a strictly
increasing function. If a second root exists the derivative
must be zero somewhere ∈ (0, 1), moreover positive at
ξ = 1. This condition translates into
G′1(1)− 1 > 0. (32)
Substituting the definition of G1(x) leads to
G′′0(1) > 〈k〉 . (33)
As expected, this condition is equivalent to the perco-
lation condition given in Eqs. (27) and (28). Therefore
below percolation, the only solution to Eq. (31) is ξ = 1,
which translates into S = 0, which makes sense since S
is the size of the giant component which does not exist
below percolation.
IV. RESULTS
In this section different attachment kernels and two
different density distributions are considered. These are
mutual and random attachment i.e. f(x, y) = xy and
f(x, y) = 1, coupled with power-law fitness ρ(x) ∝ x−a,
and ρ(x) ∝ e−ax. Although correlated mutual attrac-
tiveness can possibly be investigated with the technology
that is presented here, the evaluation of Eqs. (27) and
(28) is very difficult numerically. Therefore, we have de-
cided to consider random attachment compared to the
most simple mutual attractiveness f(x, y) = xy. The two
specific fitness distributions have been chosen since they
allow an interesting comparison between various network
motifs. Power-law probability distributions can be found
in many areas of scientific interest [6, 31]. But also ex-
ponential distributions are justifiable in certain scenarios
and can be found in real data [32]. Exponential distribu-
tions are considered to illustrate the effect of heavier tails
on percolation in this class of networks. While the theory
in the body of this article is derived for fitness distributed
over the unit interval, the domain of the power-law is
constrained to [10−3, 1] for the numerical evaluation in
order to avoid the singularity at x = 0. The form of
the resulting degree distribution of these networks fol-
lows two distinct patterns, power-law and exponential.
This is illustrated in Fig. 5. It is clear from Fig. 5 that
most configurations lead to an exponential or exponen-
tially decaying degree distribution. However, as is eluci-
dated below, the resulting spreading behavior is entirely
different from case to case. Notice as well the different be-
havior between the dynamic and the static fitness model.
While the dynamic model produces a power-law degree
distribution over the whole range of k for f(x, y) = xy
and power-law fitness, the static model produces a power
law with cutoff at large k. The fact that many configu-
rations lead to similar degree distributions, but display
an entirely different failure spreading behavior highlights
the importance of the distinction between static and dy-
namic fitness models.
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FIG. 5. Degree distributions for the different configurations that are under consideration. Dashed lines for random attachment-
ment f(x, y) = 1 and solid lines for mutual attractiveness f(x, y) = xy with 〈x〉 = 0.05 and 〈k〉 = 2 in all cases. (a) Dynamic
model, exponential fitness distribution. (b) Dynamic model, power-law fitness. (c) Static model, exponential fitness, (d) Static
model, power-law fitness.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Occupied fraction of the percolating vulnerable component in the dynamic (a) and static (b) network.
(a) is on a log-linear scale for improved magnification of the chart area of interest. The different plot character indicate different
average degrees: # (blue) – 〈k〉 = 1, 2 (magenta) – 〈k〉 = 2, 4 (mustard) – 〈k〉 = 5, and O (green) – 〈k〉 = 10. The different
attachment kernels are indicated with solid plot characters for f(x, y) = xy and hollow characters for f(x, y) = 1. Finally, the
two different fitness distributions are distinguished by line type. Solid line for ρ(x) ∝ x−a and dashed line for ρ(x) ∝ e−ax.
Fig. 6 illustrates analytical results on the vulnerable
fraction S depending on the average fitness 〈x〉 and av-
erage degree 〈k〉. Results for the dynamic and the static
model are displayed separately. The differences between
these two models are not only quantitative, but also of
qualitative nature. The percolation threshold – if it ex-
ists – is (other things being equal) independent of the
average node degree in the dynamic model, but differs
in the static model. Additionally, the static network can
become entirely occupied by the vulnerable component.
This is not possible in the dynamic case. There is one ar-
tifact that does not derive from the topological properties
of the network. In the case of power-law distributed fit-
ness, coupled with random attachment, the network can
never obtain a state in which the vulnerable component
vanishes. This is an artifact that comes from
sup
a
{∫ 1
10−3
xρ(x; a)dx
}
= 0.145..., ρ(x; a) ∝ x−a.
(34)
This supremum of average fitness is not sufficient to sta-
bilize the network. The supremum is higher for the case
of exponential distributed fitness, which leads to the mis-
leading finding that for the otherwise same configuration,
the exponential fitness induced network is more stable
than its power-law induced counterpart. For the case
of mutual selection (solid lines), the power-law induced
network (circles) is significantly more robust than the ex-
ponential network (triangles). This is evident from the
onset of the large vulnerable component that occurs only
at very small 〈x〉 in the case of mutual selection. A fur-
ther aspect that appears in Fig. 6 is that the introduc-
tion of mutual attractiveness stabilizes the network. The
percolation threshold, that marks the onset of the giant
9vulnerable component is notably larger in terms of 〈x〉
for random attachment. The case of the static network
with 〈k〉 = 1 appears to be special as percolation never
occurs. This is due to the lack of overall connectivity
and not caused by anything inherent to the model. A
further particularity revealed in Fig. 6 is that the order
of sizes of the percolating component for the same f and
ρ differ for increasing 〈k〉. Take for instance the case of
f(x, y) = xy and ρ(x) ∝ e−ax, represented by solid lines
and triangles. In the case of the dynamic model, the con-
figuration with 〈k〉 = 10 appears to be most stable, while
it is the second to last stable configuration in the case of
the static network. Similarly 〈k〉 = 1 is most stable in
the static network, and most unstable for the dynamic
case. However, these comparisons are only of ordinal na-
ture, notice that the size of the vulnerable component is
significantly larger in the static network compared to the
dynamic setting.
Consider additionally to the attachment kernels that
were illustrated in Fig. 6, also
f1(x, y) = e
x−y and f2(x, y) = ey−x. (35)
f1 is leading to a scenario in which exposure is flowing
from fit nodes to weak ones, while f2 induces the re-
verse, a network that favors weak nodes to be exposed
to strong ones. The percolation thresholds differ signifi-
cantly in these two scenarios. We compare configurations
with exponential fitness, because the power-law distribu-
tion does not reach sufficient average fitness to stabilize
the system induced by f1 and f2 with q = 1. With expo-
nential distributed fitness, the percolation threshold for
f1 is given by 〈x〉∗ = 0.213..., for f2, it is 〈x〉∗ = 0.443....
This shows that a system in which exposure flows from
strong participants to weak ones is significantly more sta-
ble than a system that favors exposure flow from weak
to strong. This makes sense. Consider for instance the
banking sector with its flow of credit exposure. It is much
more important for the system’s stability that the ex-
posed parties (creditors) are robust, that it is that the
exposing side (debtor) is robust. Low fitness nodes are
less likely to propagate shocks, since they are less well
connected. This also means that in the case of retail
banking, it is more important for the system as a whole
to guarantee a strong financial position of the main par-
ticipants than to employ a very rigorous customer scru-
tinization procedure.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed the coupling of propensity to form
edges in the network with the robustness of failures using
one variable called fitness. The assumption of this cou-
pling is realistic in many scenarios because the robustness
– be it financial or health – is directly related to the at-
tractiveness of an individual in a contact process. The re-
sulting theory can help to devise immunization strategies
not through direct rewiring or protecting single nodes but
rather by incentivizing individuals to form a more stable
structure. It is shown in this paper that the introduc-
tion of a tax, or a stimulus to form new edges within
the network can stabilize the network without violating
individual preferences that are described by f(x, y). An-
other aspect that has been illustrated in this article is
the importance of the distinction between dynamic and
static fitness models. The percolation behavior of these
two network classes is entirely different. The percolation
threshold in the dynamic model is only influenced by the
attachment kernel and the distribution of fitness, while
the results for the static model show that additionally
the average degree has a direct impact on the onset of
the percolating cluster. Furthermore, the static network
can be entirely occupied with the percolating component,
while this is impossible in the dynamic model. Also, the
broadness of the fitness distribution has an effect on the
stability of the network. A Wide variety of fitness among
individuals stabilizes the network. Moreover, the attach-
ment kernel has a profound influence on the way an epi-
demic spreads. Mutual attractiveness, i.e. f(x, y) = xy
induces a network that is significantly more resilient than
a network composed by pure random attachment.
In this paper, the networks we investigated were flat
so that shocks could only propagate on one layer. For
future research, it would be interesting to investigate how
a multiplex architecture with similar rules behaves and
whether the findings are comparable to ones that were
found here.
Appendix A
The recurrence relation in Eq. (3) can be solved using
a generating function approach. Define
F
(s)
M,N (s|x) =
∑
k≥0
p
(s)
M,N (k|x)sk. (A1)
Multiplying Eq. (3) with sk and summing over k leads
to
F
(s)
M+1,N (s|x)− F (s)M,N (s|x) = F (s)M,N (s|x)λ(x,N)(s− 1).
(A2)
For large M , Eq. (A2) can be approximated as an or-
dinary differential equation in M with initial condition
F
(s)
0,N (s|x) = 1. The initial condition arises from the ob-
servation that in a network without edges, the conditional
degree distribution is peaked at zero: p
(s)
0,N (k|x) = δk0,
where δxy is the Kronecker Delta. Using this, and that
1/N is a factor of λ(x,N), leads to
FM (s|x) = eM/N λ(x) (s−1). (A3)
Expanding Eq. (A3) in s around s = 0 leads to
p
(s)
M,N (k|x) =
e−M/N λ(x)(MN λ(x))
k
Γ(k + 1)
. (A4)
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Eq. (14) can be solved using a generating function ap-
proach that has already been used in the previous ap-
pendix. Define
F
(d)
t (s|x, τ) =
∑
k≥0
p
(d)
t (k|x, τ)sk. (B1)
Multiplying Eq. (14) with sk and summing over k leads
to
F
(d)
t (s|x, τ) = F (d)t (s|x, τ)(1− θq(x, t))
+ θq(x, t)s F
(d)
t (s|x, τ).
(B2)
Since a node enters the network with one inward pointing
edge, the initial condition is given by p
(d)
t (k|x, t) = δk0,
so that F
(d)
t (s|x, t) = 1. Using this initial condition and
that 1/t is a factor of θq(x, t), the solution of Eq. (B2) is
given by
F
(d)
t (s|x, τ) =
(
t
τ
)θq(x)(s−1)
. (B3)
Averaging over entry times leads to
F (d)(s|x) =
∫ t
0
(
t
τ
)θq(x)(s−1) dτ
t
(B4)
=
1
1 + θq(x)(1− s) . (B5)
The expansion of this expression in s around s = 0 leads
to the stationary conditional degree distribution
p(d)(k|x) =
(
θq(x)
1 + θq(x)
)k
1
1 + θq(x)
. (B6)
Appendix C
Define the probability that a node with out-degree k
belongs to a vulnerable component of size c as ζ(c|k).
ζ(c|k) can be derived constructively by noting that the
sum of nodes that can be reached following each of the
nodes edges must sum up to c− 1:
ζ(c|k) =
∑
t1≥1
· · ·
∑
tk≥1
δ
(
c− 1,
k∑
m=1
tm
)
k∏
m=1
φ(tm) (C1)
Where δ(x, y) is the Kronecker Delta. Now denote the
probability that a randomly chosen node belongs to a
vulnerable component of size c with pi(c). This is simply
pi(c) =
∑
k≥1
Q(k)ζ(c|k). (C2)
The generating function for pi(c) can be computed in the
same way as for example outlined in Ref. [29]:
∑
c≥1
pi(c)xc =
∑
c≥1
xc
∑
k≥1
Q(k)ζ(c|k) (C3)
=
∑
k≥0
Q(k)
∑
c≥1
xc
∑
t1≥1
· · ·
∑
tk≥1
δ
(
c− 1,
k∑
m=1
tm
)
k∏
m=1
φ(tm) (C4)
= x
∑
k≥0
Q(k)
∑
t1≥1
· · ·
∑
tk≥1
x
∑k
m=1 tm
k∏
m=1
φ(tm) (C5)
= x
∑
k≥1
Q(k)
∑
t≥1
φ(t)xt
k (C6)
= x
∑
k≥1
Q(k)(H1(x))
k (C7)
The result of the calculation above is the generating func-
tion of a vulnerable component of size one or greater.
However, the possibility that the initially chosen node
is not vulnerable, hence the random choice selected
11
an empty vulnerable component of size zero must also
be taken into account. This probability is given by
1 − ∑k≥0Q(k), hence the generating function for the
probability that a randomly chosen node is part of a vul-
nerable component is given by
H0(x) = 1−G0(1) + xG0(H1(x)). (C8)
The generating function for H1(x) can be established in
a similar way and is given by
H1(x) = 1−G1(1) + xG1(H1(x)). (C9)
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